HOKUS POKUS

1976
During the occupation of the site for the planned nuclear power station at Kaiseraugst (near Basel/Switzerland) April 1975 I had participated in so-called negotiations with the Swiss Government’s Energy Delegation at Berne, and discussions with official federal experts. This awakened my interest for the problem of nuclear waste, which resulted in: RADIOAKTIVE ABFÄLLE - HOKUS POKUS VERSCHWINDIBUS RADIOACTIVE WASTE - HEY PRESTO BEGONE ! A DOCUMENTATION ON THE PROBLEMS OF PERMANENT DEPOSITION OF RADIOACTIVE WASTE IN SWITZERLAND (German language), by Konradin KREUZER, FORUM FÜR VERANTWORTBARE ANWENDUNG DER WISSENSCHAFT, Basel, November 1976; pdf, 100 pages "But if this extremely grave act of resistance is to be justified, the time has come for qualified expert opinion to demonstrate convincingly that the constitutional authorities in community, canton, and federal government are in fact misjudging a grave danger for the population." (Prof. Dr. (Laws) Werner KAEGI, University of Zürich) with reference to the Kaiseraugst site occupation, Neue Zürcher Zeitung of 7 June 1975 The Forum for Responsible Application of Science claims that its Documentation on the Problems of Radioactive Waste does in fact provide the convincing demonstration called for by Prof. KAEGI. [ Professor KAEGI has never answered our invitation to discuss the problem ] SUMMARY On 23 September 1959, Federal Councillor Max PETITPIERRE announced to the National Council (lower house) that the Federal Council had directed the Federal Commission for the Supervision of Radioactivity to find a location suitable for the deposition or burial of radioactive wastes. Didn't anything happen? Ten years later, in 1969, the Federal Energy Office asked the Swiss Association for Atomic Energy (SVA) to look into the question of radioactive waste as part of a study on the atomic fuel cycle. When the SVA's study was submitted in 1971, the ordered chapter on "radioactive waste" was nowhere to be found. On 18 September 1975, the top responsible federal officials declared in the "expert" discussions on Kaiseraugst that the problem of highly radioactive waste was not an urgent one. On 4 December 1975 the Federal Energy Office submitted a report entitled (in translation) "RADIOACTIVE WASTE FROM ATOMIC ENERGY GENERATION" to the head of the Federal Transport and Energy Ministry; it was not made public until August 1976. Though the inadequate report did convey an idea of the international perplexity and lack of planning in this matter, it failed to communicate anything like the gravity and long-term significance of the problem to the layman recipient, Federal Councillor Willy RITSCHARD. The root problem is being touched on only superficially in Switzerland, while the resistance in the communities affected by the exploration applications is depicted as the main difficulty. The claim that no particular trouble is involved in the elimination of low- and medium-radioactivity wastes shows how serious the problem is being underestimated. Since the end of 1972, the National Cooperative for the Deposition of Radioactive Waste (NAGRA) has concerned itself with the job of finding and preparing permanent repositories in Switzerland - first for low- and medium-radioactivity waste, later for the high-radioactivity waste. By now the NAGRA has managed to reshape its mandate sufficiently so that it is no longer looking for permanent repositories but temporary ones. In other words, it is endeavouring to pass the buck to future generations. The selection of the first five locations for exploratory drilling was based on deficient geological and engineering analysis, and was carried out without asking those familiar with local conditions. Disqualification factors (such as utilization for mining purposes, movement of the earth's crust and proximity to earthquake centers, springs for potable water supply) were hardly considered at all. During its campaign of "courtesy visits" to the local communities involved, the NAGRA was less than frank in its information policy. When its publicity people were forced more and more into a corner of objections and critical questions, they started contradicting themselves all along the line (political-legal arguments, engineering arguments, questions of safety far into the future) and were no longer taken seriously by the local residents. Now that the new Radiation Protection Ordinance of 1 August 1976 has taken effect, new confusion has been created about who is responsible for the radioactive waste of different strength levels coming from atomic energy generation. The Realization is dawning gradually in many nuclear countries that the current radioactive waste elimination picture is anything but rosy. Permission to build new nuclear power plants is being withheld temporarily in the USA - and under a new law in the state of California - until it has been demonstrated conclusively that the waste problem is solved. Such a freeze is also being talked about in other countries. In Switzerland, though, the authorities have given no indication that a licence moratorium is under consideration. On the contrary: despite promises given in the Kaiseraugst negotiation of 18 November 1975 that new plants would not be approved before open questions (including that of waste) were cleared up, new licences are still being granted and announced. "Unsolved' doesn't necessarily mean 'insoluble' " (Dr. R. WEBER, SVA, 1976). This propaganda statement contains half of the truth. The other half is: 'Unsolved' may mean 'insoluble'. Considerable data (including NAGRA's) make it appear questionable whether Switzerland's anhydrite formations are suitable for permanent deposition. In no other country is anhydrite under consideration. The possibility that Switzerland may not be capable of providing any permanent solution (even for low- and medium-radioactivity waste) should not be ruled out even before the investigations have started. What is the Energy Office going to do if Switzerland proves unsuitable for the permanent deposition of highly radioactive waste, and other countries are not interested in taking it off our hands? [emphasis added 2001] The only way these enormous problems will become soluble and the way out of the maze can be sought and found is for the responsible authorities to take the two initial steps necessary for a fresh review and for reassurance of the understandably uneasy population: an immediate freeze on all new licences (including partial ones!) for nuclear energy production, and the express renouncement of the use of the federal government's instruments of power against the will of the affected inhabitants. Then, and only then, can the authorities expect the people to show appreciation for the need to investigate the deposition possibilities - providing the investigation is carried out in a serious and scientific manner, which has not been the case so far.

1976

During the occupation of the site for the planned nuclear power station at Kaiseraugst (near Basel/Switzerland) April 1975 I had participated in so-called negotiations with the Swiss Government’s Energy Delegation at Berne, and discussions with official federal experts. This awakened my interest for the problem of nuclear waste, which resulted in:

RADIOAKTIVE ABFÄLLE - HOKUS POKUS VERSCHWINDIBUS
RADIOACTIVE WASTE - HEY PRESTO BEGONE !

A DOCUMENTATION ON THE PROBLEMS OF PERMANENT DEPOSITION OF RADIOACTIVE WASTE IN SWITZERLAND (German language), by Konradin KREUZER, FORUM FÜR VERANTWORTBARE ANWENDUNG DER WISSENSCHAFT, Basel, November 1976; pdf, 100 pages

"But if this extremely grave act of resistance is to be justified, the time has come for qualified expert opinion to demonstrate convincingly that the constitutional authorities in community, canton, and federal government are in fact misjudging a grave danger for the population."
(Prof. Dr. (Laws) Werner KAEGI, University of Zürich) with reference to the Kaiseraugst site occupation, Neue Zürcher Zeitung of 7 June 1975

The Forum for Responsible Application of Science claims that its Documentation on the Problems of Radioactive Waste does in fact provide the convincing demonstration called for by Prof. KAEGI.

[ Professor KAEGI has never answered our invitation to discuss the problem ]

SUMMARY

On 23 September 1959, Federal Councillor Max PETITPIERRE announced to the National Council (lower house) that the Federal Council had directed the Federal Commission for the Supervision of Radioactivity to find a location suitable for the deposition or burial of radioactive wastes. Didn't anything happen?

Ten years later, in 1969, the Federal Energy Office asked the Swiss Association for Atomic Energy (SVA) to look into the question of radioactive waste as part of a study on the atomic fuel cycle. When the SVA's study was submitted in 1971, the ordered chapter on "radioactive waste" was nowhere to be found.

On 18 September 1975, the top responsible federal officials declared in the "expert" discussions on Kaiseraugst that the problem of highly radioactive waste was not an urgent one.

On 4 December 1975 the Federal Energy Office submitted a report entitled (in translation) "RADIOACTIVE WASTE FROM ATOMIC ENERGY GENERATION" to the head of the Federal Transport and Energy Ministry; it was not made public until August 1976. Though the inadequate report did convey an idea of the international perplexity and lack of planning in this matter, it failed to communicate anything like the gravity and long-term significance of the problem to the layman recipient, Federal Councillor Willy RITSCHARD. The root problem is being touched on only superficially in Switzerland, while the resistance in the communities affected by the exploration applications is depicted as the main difficulty. The claim that no particular trouble is involved in the elimination of low- and medium-radioactivity wastes shows how serious the problem is being underestimated.

Since the end of 1972, the National Cooperative for the Deposition of Radioactive Waste (NAGRA) has concerned itself with the job of finding and preparing permanent repositories in Switzerland - first for low- and medium-radioactivity waste, later for the high-radioactivity waste. By now the NAGRA has managed to reshape its mandate sufficiently so that it is no longer looking for permanent repositories but temporary ones. In other words, it is endeavouring to pass the buck to future generations. The selection of the first five locations for exploratory drilling was based on deficient geological and engineering analysis, and was carried out without asking those familiar with local conditions. Disqualification factors (such as utilization for mining purposes, movement of the earth's crust and proximity to earthquake centers, springs for potable water supply) were hardly considered at all.

During its campaign of "courtesy visits" to the local communities involved, the NAGRA was less than frank in its information policy. When its publicity people were forced more and more into a corner of objections and critical questions, they started contradicting themselves all along the line (political-legal arguments, engineering arguments, questions of safety far into the future) and were no longer taken seriously by the local residents.

Now that the new Radiation Protection Ordinance of 1 August 1976 has taken effect, new confusion has been created about who is responsible for the radioactive waste of different strength levels coming from atomic energy generation.

The Realization is dawning gradually in many nuclear countries that the current radioactive waste elimination picture is anything but rosy. Permission to build new nuclear power plants is being withheld temporarily in the USA - and under a new law in the state of California - until it has been demonstrated conclusively that the waste problem is solved. Such a freeze is also being talked about in other countries. In Switzerland, though, the authorities have given no indication that a licence moratorium is under consideration. On the contrary: despite promises given in the Kaiseraugst negotiation of 18 November 1975 that new plants would not be approved before open questions (including that of waste) were cleared up, new licences are still being granted and announced.

"Unsolved' doesn't necessarily mean 'insoluble' " (Dr. R. WEBER, SVA, 1976). This propaganda statement contains half of the truth. The other half is: 'Unsolved' may mean 'insoluble'. Considerable data (including NAGRA's) make it appear questionable whether Switzerland's anhydrite formations are suitable for permanent deposition. In no other country is anhydrite under consideration. The possibility that Switzerland may not be capable of providing any permanent solution (even for low- and medium-radioactivity waste) should not be ruled out even before the investigations have started. What is the Energy Office going to do if Switzerland proves unsuitable for the permanent deposition of highly radioactive waste, and other countries are not interested in taking it off our hands? [emphasis added 2001]

The only way these enormous problems will become soluble and the way out of the maze can be sought and found is for the responsible authorities to take the two initial steps necessary for a fresh review and for reassurance of the understandably uneasy population: an immediate freeze on all new licences (including partial ones!) for nuclear energy production, and the express renouncement of the use of the federal government's instruments of power against the will of the affected inhabitants. Then, and only then, can the authorities expect the people to show appreciation for the need to investigate the deposition possibilities - providing the investigation is carried out in a serious and scientific manner, which has not been the case so far.